Since this is a study abroad trip, I am writing several papers for credit. The first project is based on a very interesting book Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds by Stephen Kinzer, the former Istanbul bureau chief for the New York Times, and consists of answers to four questions.
2. In Chapter Three, entitled “Call to Prayer”, Kinzer refers to Turkey as the “most secular of Muslim countries”. How did Atatürk deal with religion in the early stages of the Turkish republic? What role does religion play in Turkish politics and society today?
From his European travels and studies, Atatürk came to understand the role of religion as a negative force, to be separated from official workings of a state. Among the first significant Kemalist reforms was systematic dismantling of religion, the legacy of hundreds of years of the Islamic Ottoman Empire. Nothing was safe from Atatürk’s vision for his modern, educated, democratic Turkey. One by one, symbols and expressions of Islam were banned, disfavored, and deinstitutionalized. The fez, head scarf, call of muezzin, traditional clothing, polygamy, apostasy, rights of women, nothing was ‘sacred’. In order to modernize Turkey and catch up to the west, Atatürk was determined to force his vision on the old country and quickly, without recourse, autocratically. By forcibly discarding what he considered backward tradition, the religion of Islam was quickly replaced by the religion of ‘secularism’.
Secularism was systematically reinforced through all of the Kemalist reforms. New system of government was entirely secular, representative, democratic, and with equal voting rights for women. Educational reforms shifted schooling from religious schools to state educational system, with secular and uniform education. Again, girls were given unprecedented equality, further reinforcing the change from traditional, Islam-influenced culture toward a modern, secular society. Furthermore, Islamic system of laws was separated from state jurisprudence for the first time, relegated to religious matters only, and replaced by a new penal code modeled on Italian laws.
Before the stunned population could mount effective resistance, the force of Atatürk’s personality cult and Kemalism already embedded throughout the socioeconomic structure of the post-Ottoman Turkey prevented return toward traditional Islamic society and culture. Religion was not forbidden, Turks were free to practice Islam and to pray in mosques and to observe their religious rituals. What has changed was the official role of religion in government and jurisprudence; that was replaced by secularism and adaptation of western ideas.
While there were few brief periods of religiously-oriented post-Atatürk governments, Kemalism is so strongly embedded in the psyche of modern Turkey that secularism is a pillar of the Republic of Turkey. The government of Justice and Development Party (AKP), in power since 2002 and led by the Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Gül, is the first long-term Islamic government in power in Turkey. AKP was founded in 2001 in response to excesses and rigidness of the Kemalist establishment, as well as corruption and general stagnation. Erdoğan’s vision brought massive economic prosperity and increasing international status, as well as relaxation of anti-religious rules and increase in conservatism. The present Turkey is still a secular state, ran by Islamist party, which creates an interesting polarity. Due to a chronic Kemalist suppression of Islamic values, AKP is a significant democratic force. By promoting tolerance and acceptance for all, its values are freely expressed in today’s Turkish society. Women are free to wear head scarves, religious discrimination has been lifted, and Islamic culture and tradition is being openly embraced and encouraged again. Yet Turkey pursues secular, western-oriented both domestic and foreign policy. The dichotomy is uniquely Turkish, with unique Turkish solutions.
2. In Chapter Three, entitled “Call to Prayer”, Kinzer refers to Turkey as the “most secular of Muslim countries”. How did Atatürk deal with religion in the early stages of the Turkish republic? What role does religion play in Turkish politics and society today?
From his European travels and studies, Atatürk came to understand the role of religion as a negative force, to be separated from official workings of a state. Among the first significant Kemalist reforms was systematic dismantling of religion, the legacy of hundreds of years of the Islamic Ottoman Empire. Nothing was safe from Atatürk’s vision for his modern, educated, democratic Turkey. One by one, symbols and expressions of Islam were banned, disfavored, and deinstitutionalized. The fez, head scarf, call of muezzin, traditional clothing, polygamy, apostasy, rights of women, nothing was ‘sacred’. In order to modernize Turkey and catch up to the west, Atatürk was determined to force his vision on the old country and quickly, without recourse, autocratically. By forcibly discarding what he considered backward tradition, the religion of Islam was quickly replaced by the religion of ‘secularism’.
Secularism was systematically reinforced through all of the Kemalist reforms. New system of government was entirely secular, representative, democratic, and with equal voting rights for women. Educational reforms shifted schooling from religious schools to state educational system, with secular and uniform education. Again, girls were given unprecedented equality, further reinforcing the change from traditional, Islam-influenced culture toward a modern, secular society. Furthermore, Islamic system of laws was separated from state jurisprudence for the first time, relegated to religious matters only, and replaced by a new penal code modeled on Italian laws.
Before the stunned population could mount effective resistance, the force of Atatürk’s personality cult and Kemalism already embedded throughout the socioeconomic structure of the post-Ottoman Turkey prevented return toward traditional Islamic society and culture. Religion was not forbidden, Turks were free to practice Islam and to pray in mosques and to observe their religious rituals. What has changed was the official role of religion in government and jurisprudence; that was replaced by secularism and adaptation of western ideas.
While there were few brief periods of religiously-oriented post-Atatürk governments, Kemalism is so strongly embedded in the psyche of modern Turkey that secularism is a pillar of the Republic of Turkey. The government of Justice and Development Party (AKP), in power since 2002 and led by the Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Gül, is the first long-term Islamic government in power in Turkey. AKP was founded in 2001 in response to excesses and rigidness of the Kemalist establishment, as well as corruption and general stagnation. Erdoğan’s vision brought massive economic prosperity and increasing international status, as well as relaxation of anti-religious rules and increase in conservatism. The present Turkey is still a secular state, ran by Islamist party, which creates an interesting polarity. Due to a chronic Kemalist suppression of Islamic values, AKP is a significant democratic force. By promoting tolerance and acceptance for all, its values are freely expressed in today’s Turkish society. Women are free to wear head scarves, religious discrimination has been lifted, and Islamic culture and tradition is being openly embraced and encouraged again. Yet Turkey pursues secular, western-oriented both domestic and foreign policy. The dichotomy is uniquely Turkish, with unique Turkish solutions.
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